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ABSTRACT: This article outlines the progression of Russia’s use
of unconventional warfare. This perspective provides strategists
and policymakers with insights into the actions leading up to and
extending from Russia’s annexation and occupation of Ukrainian
territory since 2014.

R

ussia has engaged in unconventional warfare by supporting
insurgencies into the twenty-first century. When discussing
the concept of unconventional warfare, this paper refers to a
specific subset of irregular warfare, which American doctrine defines
“as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy
and influence over the relevant populations.” 1 Under US law, unconventional warfare includes “activities conducted to enable a resistance
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government
or occupying power by operating through or with an underground,
auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.” 2 The US response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when America supported opposition fighters in Afghanistan, provides an example of unconventional
warfare. In Afghanistan, US Special Forces worked with the Northern
Alliance, a guerilla group, to overthrow the Taliban, a radical Islamic
regime that had collaborated with and harbored Osama bin Laden’s alQaeda terrorist organization.3
Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong wrote the eponymous
book on guerilla warfare during 1937, in the midst of war with the
Japanese empire. When speaking of guerilla warfare and insurgency,
Mao separated such warfare into three phases. The first focused on
training, organization, and consolidating forces in a hard-to-reach safe
haven. From there, “direct action” increases, weakening the enemy
forces through sabotage and terrorism as well as ambushing them when
they are vulnerable—all while gathering weapons and supplies as well
as working politically to indoctrinate and to educate the populace. Only
in the third, decisive phase does the guerilla force finally transition into
a traditional, conventional military force, attacking and destroying the
enemy in a final campaign.4 As will be demonstrated, however, Russia
appears to spurn Mao’s oft-referenced guidance on guerilla warfare.
1      US Department of Defense (DoD), Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), version
1.0 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2007), 1.
2      National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 129 Stat.
1021 (2015).
3      Steve Balestrieri, “Battle of Mazar e Sharif, Special Forces Troops Mount Horseback Assault,”
Special Operations, November 8, 2017.
4      Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, Fleet Marine Force Reference
Publication 12-18 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1989), 20–22.
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Unconventional warfare stands in direct contrast to conventional,
or traditional, warfare. According to the Department of Defense,
“Traditional warfare is characterized as a violent struggle for domination
between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states . . .[and]
typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries
employ a variety of conventional forces and special operations forces
(SOF) against each other in all physical domains.” 5 When picturing
modern conventional warfare, major twentieth-century conflicts from
World War II through Operation Desert Storm come to mind, with large
professional armies engaging in a war of maneuver. In unconventional
warfare, Russia shows a tendency for skipping Mao’s first two phases
in favor of building guerillas into a conventional force. The Russian
military lexicon even appears to lack terminology directly comparable to
the American terms of irregular or unconventional warfare. Historically
and currently, the Russian military thinks about unconventional warfare
in a decidedly conventional way.

Russian Unconventional Warfare

Russia’s modern approach to unconventional warfare has its roots
in Soviet partisan fighting against Nazi Germany during World War
II. Indeed, that experience had a strong influence on Soviet thinking
through the end of the Cold War. Writing on the relevance of the
Soviet partisan movement to contemporary guerilla movements in the
1980s, Soviet Major General Viktor N. Andrianov characterized the
development of partisan bands as a natural evolution into larger, more
conventionally equipped and organized military units that could even
have the capability to become offensive formations moving into other
occupied countries and aiding other partisan bands. In drawing parallels
between the Soviet partisan movement and the contemporary Russian
movements, Andrianov’s main observation was that a key component of
Soviet-supported national liberation wars was the guerilla force growing
and taking on a conventional army organization as people’s liberation
armies.6 From the beginning, the Soviet desire for waging insurgencies
made the unconventional, conventional, as soon as possible.
Prime examples of this conventional attitude toward unconventional
warfare can be found throughout Soviet support of unconventional
conflicts in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. During the internal
conflict against the white-minority government of Rhodesia, which
is now Zimbabwe, the Soviet Union backed the left-wing Zimbabwe
African People’s Union, and its military arm, the Zimbabwe People’s
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). In the final years of the Rhodesian
Bush War, from 1977 to 1979, ZIPRA received logistical guidance and
training from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Cuba,
operating out of neighboring Zambia. This support had a role in ZIPRA
shifting its overall strategy towards a conventional war in Rhodesia
during that period. This effort contrasted with the Zimbabwe African
National Union, and its military arm, the Zimbabwe African National
5      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication
1 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013), ix–x.
6      Graham Hall Turbiville Jr., Logistic Support and Insurgency: Guerrilla Sustainment and Applied Lessons
of Soviet Insurgent Warfare: Why It Should Still Be Studied, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)
Report 05-4 (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2005), 13–15.

TOC

Traditional War

Savage

79

Liberation Army, which was backed by China through Mozambique and
adhered to Maoist inspired strategies of insurgency, mobilization, and
revolutionary guerilla warfare.7
Additional examples of this Soviet tendency occurred due west of
Zimbabwe—in Angola, Zaire, and Namibia—during the same period.
One of these examples is the Shaba conflicts (1977–78) in Zaire—now
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Angolan and Cuban forces,
which were backed and supplied by the Soviet Union, provided training
and support in Angola to the Congolese National Liberation Front
(FLNC), a rebel group, as it launched an invasion into the southern
Shaba province of Zaire. Despite being an unconventional conflict in
theory, the organization, tactics, and equipment of the FLNC’s invasion
was largely conventional—as was Zaire’s response that included foreign
support from 1,200 Moroccan troops with artillery.8 Namibia provides
another case of a Soviet-backed revolution. In this instance, the South
West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) fought for independence
from apartheid South Africa. Operating out of southern Angola, with
support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Angola, the thousands of
liberation troops were joined by an elite, conventionally trained and
organized brigade of 1,500 to 2,000 men that consisted of motorized
infantry battalions and a detachment of Soviet BRDM armored cars.9
Aside from a desire to forge allied unconventional forces into
conventional ones, there was also an occasional tendency for the Soviets
to intervene directly, forcibly transforming an unconventional conflict
into a conventional one. Initially, the Soviet Union’s support of national
proliberation movements and recently liberated Third World states
was largely limited to supplying some weapons, training, and political
support. This approach began to change after the mid-1960s, as the
United States began to disengage, and eventually withdrew, from the
Vietnam War. Taking advantage of post-Vietnam US disengagement,
the Soviet Union became more directly involved militarily in multiple
Third World conflicts. One clear example is the Soviet intervention
leading up to Angola’s independence from Portugal. From 1974 to
1975, the Soviets not only supplied weaponry to its preferred faction,
the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, but also provided
direct logistical support and transportation. The Soviet Union also
supported thousands of conventional troops sent by Communist Cuba
to strengthen the faction, which led to the Angolan civil war.10
Although Moscow was able to provide significant support to the
guerillas in the Angola case, it also serves as an example of how direct
Soviet intervention in unconventional conflicts far away from the
USSR’s periphery was still fairly limited during the Cold War. Even
at the height of its military power, and after having made significant
improvements to its ability to undertake force projection via air and
7      Sue Onslow and Anna-Mart van Wyk, eds., Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2013), 165.
     8      Malutama di Malu, The Shaba Invasions (thesis, US Army Command and General Staff
College, 1981), 22–32, 46; and Thomas P. Odom, Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in
1978 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 16–20.
9      Office of African and Latin American Analysis, Namibia: SWAPO’s Army—Organization,
Tactics, and Prospects (Washington, DC: US Central Intelligence Agency, 1984), 1–7.
10      Roger E. Kanet, “The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for
‘Wars of National Liberation,’ ” Cold War History 6, no. 3 (2006): 335–38.
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sea at long distances, the Soviet Union had “only a limited capability
to project military power into distant areas in the face of substantial
local or rival power armed opposition.” 11 Whenever possible, the Soviets
encouraged proxy forces and allies to undertake military interventions
as a more economical and practical method of sowing discord. This
strategy was seen on the Arabian Peninsula during 1973 when Soviet
ships were used to transport troops from Communist-aligned South
Yemen to fight in an insurgency against the Sultan of Oman who was
supported by the Iranian shah.12 And as already shown with the Angola
case, Moscow also relied heavily on Cuban forces throughout Africa,
not only to assist with training guerillas but also to engage in direct,
conventional-style military interventions in which the unconventional
force would clash with the conventional military and allies of apartheid
South Africa.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s ability and
willingness to become directly involved in unconventional warfare
appears to have increased. This interest may be due in large part to
the internal conflicts largely arising on Russia’s periphery in the newly
independent states. One clear example occurred in Moldova, where
largely ethnic Russian separatist forces attempting to gain autonomy
in the border region of Transdniestria clashed with Moldovan forces.
One of the key factors behind Russian-backed Transdniestria’s eventual
victory over Moldova was the presence of conventional elements of
Russia’s 14th Army, which offered significant support and even direct
firepower to the separatist’s cause, ensuring the enclave’s ongoing
pseudo-independence.13
A similar situation occurred in the separatist region of Abkhazia,
which attempted to break away from Georgia in 1992 following the
Soviet Union’s dissolution. Initially, Moscow’s involvement in the
conflict was confused: some elements of Russia’s government and
military supported Georgia while others supported the separatists. But
Moscow’s unofficial policy eventually shifted in support of Abkhazia.
Regional Russian commanders eventually supplied Abkhazian fighters
with large quantities of Russian weapons, intelligence, and operational
planning. The Kremlin’s direct involvement went further with aircraft
bombing the region’s capital of Sokhumi as Abkhazian separatist
forces attempted to retake it from Georgian forces in 1993.14 Russia’s
geographical proximity to Abkhazia and military presence, with bases
and troops in the region, made direct involvement more feasible and
achievable. This element played a key role in Russia’s decision and ability
to take similar action in Ukraine years later.

Case Study: Donbas since 2014

The origins of the current military conflict in Ukraine’s eastern
Donbas region are found in the overthrow of pro-Russian President
11      Edward L. Warner III, The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1989), 94–95.
12      Alex P. Schmid, Soviet Military Interventions since 1945: With a Summary in Russian, with case
studies by Ellen Berends (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985), 98.
13      US Army, Special Operations Command (SOC), “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern
Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: SOC, 2016), 10.
14      Alexandros Petersen, “The 1992–93 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict,” Caucasian
Review of International Affairs 2, no. 4 (2008): 194–98.
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Viktor Yanukovych by an opposition protest movement in early 2014.
The controversy resulted from Yanukovych’s suspension of talks on
closer ties with the European Union. In the aftermath of Yanukovych’s
flight from the Ukrainian capital of Kiev in February, Russia took
military action by seizing control of the strategic Crimean Peninsula,
utilizing forces stationed at the Sevastopol naval base, which is home
to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Russia then annexed the region after
holding a disputed referendum the following month. This vote further
deteriorated relations with the West and with Ukraine’s new, proWestern government. Around this time, antigovernment, pro-Russian
protests intensified in the eastern half of Ukraine where Yanukovych’s
political base was located. Eventually, pro-Russian groups stormed
key government buildings throughout the provinces of Donetsk
and Luhansk in the Donbas region. These provinces were declared
independent republics in April. The Ukrainian government then ordered
an “antiterrorist operation” to restore order in the region, leading to the
first military confrontations with separatist militia forces.15
Evidence suggests Russia was encouraging separatist sentiments
and supporting separatist and pro-Russian groups in the Donbas region
through its intelligence services and third-party provocateurs before
hostilities broke out.16 Moscow’s support continued and intensified
during the initial fighting, though Soviet involvement was ad hoc and
indirect, with little or no use of official military forces. Instead, Russia
used an informal network of mercenaries and volunteer fighters who
had served in other conflicts across the former Soviet Union and who
possessed a pro-Russian or Russian-nationalist outlook. A significant
amount of this indirect support namely, arms and funding, also came
through third-party Russian or pro-Russian elites rather than the
Kremlin itself, most likely to maintain plausible deniability regarding
the Russian government’s involvement.17
In these early stages of Russia’s support of unconventional warfare
in Donbas, efforts by the Russian-backed separatists to organize
themselves along conventional lines, rather than strictly as insurgents,
were already visible. In addition to the foreign fighters from throughout
the former Soviet Union, several thousand Ukrainian soldiers joined the
separatist forces—3,000 of them by August 2015—along with 5,000
local police from the rebelling oblasts. Units of fighters were often raised
as conventionally-styled units, such as battalions. These forces used
armored vehicles captured from the Ukrainian military with additional
armored vehicles later provided by Russia. These forces, supported by
local civilian groups, foiled the Ukrainian military’s initial attempts
to reestablish control over separatist areas. But these early separatist
victories against Ukraine may have largely been due to the poor state of
its military at the start of the conflict. Among other issues, only 6,000
combat ready troops were available, and they were led by a Russophone
leadership reluctant to harm other Russians.18
15      “The Ukraine Crisis Timeline: The Battle in the Donbass Begins: Ukraine Invites UN
Peacekeepers, Tacitly Supports Nationwide Referendum,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, April 14, 2014.
16      Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 33–35.
17      Kofman et al., Lessons, 55–60.
18      Kofman et al., Lessons, 40–42.
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The separatist militias also initially suffered from key institutional
weaknesses that hindered their effectiveness as conventional forces.
The separatist units did, however, include some experienced and
battle-hardened troops, mainly the defectors or some of the volunteers
from Russia or the former USSR. A prominent example is the Vostok
Battalion—a unit of predominately veteran pro-Russian fighters from
Chechnya, the pseudoindependent states of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and elsewhere in the Caucasus.19 The homegrown Ukrainian
separatist forces in the Donbas, however, were less effective and less
disciplined, allegedly engaging in looting and other illicit activities
that hurt their support among the locals. This lack of local support
contributed another factor as, despite poor popular opinions of the postrevolution government in Kiev, most locals declined to become involved
in the conflict, contributing to a shortage in separatist troops.20 Overall,
coordination and cooperation among the separatists was either poor
or lacking completely.21 This was true not only among high-ranking
leaders at the theater and strategic levels but also among unit leaders
at the tactical level. During the battle for Donetsk airport in May 2014,
for example, Russian volunteers fighting for the separatists came under
friendly fire from the Vostok Battalion after apparently being confused
for a Ukrainian unit.22
As the conflict continued, the Ukrainian military enacted largescale mobilization, calling up thousands of reserves and reinstating
conscription as well as beginning extensive restructuring, reform, and
modernization efforts.23 In the face of renewed Ukrainian military vigor
and superior firepower and airpower, the weaknesses among the separatist
forces became more apparent. This vulnerability culminated in the
Ukrainian military capturing the strategic Donetsk airport on May 26,
2014, inflicting mass casualties on separatist forces in the process.24
Russia tried to remedy this defeat from June to August by providing
separatist forces with increasing amounts of heavy conventional
weapons, including armored vehicles and tanks, surface-to-air missiles,
and other advanced systems and munitions. Despite this build up, the
Ukrainian military gained ground against the separatists in what had
become a siege campaign that capitalized on the significant advantage
in troops and firepower to encircle and push separatist forces from
populated areas. By August, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were in
danger of being isolated from one another and overrun by Ukrainian
forces pushing towards the Russian border.25 Russia and the separatists
had successfully turned an unconventional conflict into a conventional
one, but they were losing that conflict in the face of overwhelming force
as the mass support that had been expected from the populace for an
independent eastern Ukraine failed to materialize.

19      Kofman et al., Lessons, 58–60.
20      “Russians Take Charge of Ukrainian Separatists,” Stratfor, August 7, 2014.
21      Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” Survival 56, no. 6 (2014), 16.
22      Kofman et al., Lessons, 43.
23      Valeriy Akimenko, “Ukraine’s Toughest Fight: The Challenge of Military Reform,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, February 22, 2018.
24      Freedman, “Ukraine,” 15–17.
25      Kofman et al., Lessons, 44–45.
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In August 2014, to prevent the possible defeat of the separatist forces
in Donbas, Russia’s conventional forces crossed the border into Ukraine,
through separatist held territory, to help launch a large-scale counterattack
against Ukrainian government forces.26 Evidence of these incursions in
NATO satellite imagery shows heavy Russian units moving through
Ukraine. Additional intelligence reported enemy forces using advanced
Russian weapons and vehicles that were not present in the Ukrainian
military arsenal. These weapons included the hallmarks of large-scale
conventional warfare, such as tanks and armored vehicles, long-range
surface-to-air missiles, rocket artillery, and other weapons systems. 27
This counterattack managed to recapture multiple locations that had been
seized by Ukraine in its offensive, recovering the separatists’ initiative as
the Ukrainian military suffered heavy personnel and equipment losses.28
This escalation led to a series of peace talks and cease-fires negotiated in
the Belarusian capital of Minsk in 2014 and 2015.
Although the frontline has remained stable since then, fighting in
early 2018 continued in violation of the two 2015 Minsk agreements.
Russo-Ukrainian tensions remain high, and Ukraine’s parliament
officially declared Russia an “aggressor” and the Donbas territories
“under temporary occupation.” 29
Russia’s escalation of the conflict involved not only committing its
own troops to the war but also embarking on new efforts to improve the
fighting capabilities of the proxy separatist forces that remained within
the oblast. After saving the separatists from destruction in August 2014,
Russia reportedly began paying the salaries, benefits, and pensions of
separatist political and military leaders in Donbas during 2015.30 With
the direct Russian involvement, the separatist forces have also taken
on an increasingly conventional structure and organization.31 Russia’s
military provides supplies, training, and personnel—through both
active duty soldiers and volunteers—as well as reconnaissance, special
operations, and other military capabilities.
Moscow’s forces deployed behind separatist lines in Ukraine and
directly across the border in Russia also provide reserve forces to protect
the separatists from large-scale Ukrainian counterattacks like that of
Summer 2014. This reinforcement allows separatist forces to focus
more energy and resources on frontline units and engaging in offensive
operations. This arrangement is similar to the FLNC or SWAPO in
Angola during the 1970s operating with a safety net of support from the
Soviet Union and its proxies.
Despite the rescue and the increased support from the Kremlin,
the separatist forces still have many fundamental weaknesses. Franklin
Holcomb notes the “artificially capable force” is almost entirely dependent
26      Marek Menkiszak, Rafał Sadowski, and Piotr Żochowski, “The Russian Military Intervention
in Eastern Ukraine,” Centre for Eastern Studies, September 3, 2014.
27      Victoria Butenko, Laura Smith-Spark, and Diana Magnay, “U.S. Official Says 1,000 Russian
Troops Have Entered Ukraine,” CNN, August 29, 2014.
28      Menkiszak, Sadowski, and Żochowski, “Russian Military Intervention.”
29      “Ukraine Declares Russian ‘Occupation’ in Eastern Region,” Al Jazeera, January 18, 2018.
30      “Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine, Briefing 79,” International Crisis Group,
February 5, 2016.
31      Franklin Holcomb, The Kremlin’s Irregular Army: Ukrainian Separatist Order of Battle, Russia and
Ukraine Security Report 3 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2017), 17–27.
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on Russia for its survival and effectiveness. The military capabilities
have either remained static or even degraded over four years of conflict,
while the Ukrainian military has continued to upgrade its capabilities
and armaments over time. Many separatist units are still disorganized
and fail to communicate and to work with one another efficiently in
combat. Leadership at the top levels of the separatist republics remains
an issue. Russia resorts to purges by force in order to keep its proxy
separatist entities in line. To that end, separatist forces have effectively
been reduced to a buffer and a screening force for regular Russian forces
in the Donbas, keeping Russian troops separated from the Ukrainians
and acting as scouts and skirmishers for conventional Russian units.32
An analysis of the Ukrainian conflict shows how Russia’s use of
unconventional warfare has followed its behavior during and after the
Cold War. From the beginning of the conflict, Russian support was
indirect. Efforts to create a conventional separatist military force in the
Donbas region, however, were already evident. Separatist forces were
organized along largely conventional lines, stealing and deploying heavy
weapons and vehicles, and endeavoring to take and to hold territory
for their nascent pseudostates rather than launching guerilla style hitand-run attacks or blending in with the populace. When these forces
began to struggle against the Ukrainian military, who countered them
with conventional tactics of siege and overwhelming size and firepower,
Russia’s first instinct was to increase its conventional strength through
more heavy weapons and armor. In Ukraine, as with past cases, Russia
proceeded directly to phase three of Mao’s phases of insurgency and
tried to create a conventional force to do battle with the government.
Second, when conventional separatist proxy forces suffered
military setbacks against the government’s troops despite increased
support, Russia resorted to sending its own military into combat. This
involvement saved the separatists and continued to put pressure on the
Ukrainian government. This strategy superseded Russia’s first choice
of supporting the separatists indirectly through intelligence services
and third-party benefactors. But when the widespread local support for
Novorossiya (“New Russia”) in eastern Ukraine failed to materialize as
Moscow hoped it would, this situation changed. The separatists faced
defeat, and Moscow possessed the ability to intervene quickly in force.
Russia took that opportunity to preserve the separatist forces as a means
of exerting influence on and undermining Kiev. This logic followed
that used in Angola in the 1970s but with Russia able to apply much
more force.
Third, the ability and extent to which Russia could project power
by directly intervening to save its insurgent allies was facilitated by its
proximity to the combat zone. During the Cold War, this contingency
limited Soviet intervention, as well as the quality of any support provided
to unconventional forces, in proxy conflicts far from Eurasia. In Angola,
supporting the opposition force turned out to be easier, politically and
militarily, for the Cubans with Soviet assistance than it was for the Soviets
to become directly involved. But eastern Ukraine’s shared border with
Russia’s heartland substantially elevated Russia’s ability to support the
separatists, like in Abkhazia. This position provides Russia the ability to
32      Holcomb, Kremlin’s Irregular Army, 9–11.
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augment the separatists with thousands of troops equipped with heavy
weaponry and vehicles. Ukraine may be the greatest extent of Russian
intervention on the behalf of an unconventional ally since the birth of
unconventional warfare in World War II.
In supporting such efforts in Ukraine, Russia appears to have
followed an established pattern of behavior: intervene after a potential
ally is threatened and prepare the pro-Russian force for conventional
conflict. That said, Russia’s continued adherence to this model has
not produced substantial results thus far. While fruitful in the smaller
separatist conflicts prior to Ukraine, success has not been replicated
there, in a far larger conflict involving a much more valuable territory
to Russia.
The Ukrainian government, for all its flaws, remains in power, and
continues to gain it relative to separatist forces. As the political and
military situation in Ukraine stands now, Russia’s current strategy lacks a
clear, obvious path to victory, absent escalation into a full-scale war with
Ukraine. This prospect carries the risk of greater confrontation with the
West, which reinforces the necessity of understanding Russia’s concept
of and uses for unconventional warfare as well as its understanding of
that concept in comparison to the United States and its Western allies.

Conclusions and Implications

The ongoing pattern of behavior established here explains how
Russia and its military became involved in unconventional warfare
and how Moscow chose to support irregular forces in such conflicts.
This pattern revolves heavily around the use of conventional warfare,
regardless of other, current narratives. The concept of “hybrid warfare”
used by Western analysts and experts discussing the Ukraine conflict
generally touts the mix of military and nonmilitary means as key to
Russia’s approach. But the political influence, information warfare, and
propaganda associated with this term were not able to conceive most
of the people in eastern Ukraine to support the independent Novorossiya
that Moscow wanted. Russia’s conventional warfare saved the separatist
forces in 2014. As a result, conventional escalation, by proxies or direct
intervention, remains central to Russia’s unconventional warfare.
Future research should examine Russia’s interest in and ambition for
the behaviors associated with unconventional warfare: Is it a conscious
choice based on what policymakers and military leaders know are
Russia’s strong and weak points in a conflict? Is it a more subconscious
choice based on experiences taken for granted? Does Russia simply
lack awareness of Western notions of unconventional warfare? In the
meantime, the pattern presented in this article can help allied strategists
and policymakers anticipate Russia’s actions in burgeoning and future
unconventional warfare environments and identify strategies to counter
or contain these activities—if and when, they present a threat.
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